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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Changes in law [are] full of danger.”1  The Supreme Court’s 
adherence to the principle of stare decisis speaks to this truth.  Rather 
than leap to upend well-settled doctrine, when novel situations arise, 
the Court turns to legal fictions to achieve justice while applying existing 
law2—”[f]or the written word remains, but man changes.”3  Tensions 
rise when popular ideas of justice conflict with the written law.4  To 
harmonize the two, legal fictions erupt that “mark where there was once 
a distinction between law in the books and law in action, and show one 
way in which the two have been brought into accord.”5  But the use of 
legal fictions is not without consequences.6 
Today the United States is caught in the throes of a legal fiction 
developed to extend Fourth Amendment protection to objects of an 
individual’s privacy—the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.7  
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 1 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12 (1910). 
 2 See id. at 12–13.  Pound employs a metaphor, describing the practice of using legal 
fictions as the way “the law has always managed to get a pickaxe in its hands, though it 
steadfastly demanded a case-knife, and to wield it in the virtuous belief that it was using 
the approved instrument.”  Id. 
 3 Id. at 36. 
 4 Id. at 13–15 (presenting examples of legal fictions from archaic legal systems 
through the twentieth century). 
 5 Id. at 14. 
 6 See infra Part V. 
 7 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a 
conversation that the defendant had while within a phonebooth was protected under 
the Fourth Amendment because he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy”—a new 
standard for Fourth Amendment protection). 
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Examining the history of the Fourth Amendment8 and the line of 
jurisprudence that follows from Katz9 reveals a sharp divide between 
the original intent of the Fourth Amendment and its actual application 
today.  While courts have perpetuated the use of the Katz test, it stands 
on shaky ground.10 
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. United States by 
applying Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test.11  The Court 
found that law enforcement officers had violated Carpenter’s right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure when those officers accessed 
Carpenter’s historic cell-site location information without a warrant 
because Carpenter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole 
of his movements.12  Despite the Court’s presumably good intentions, 
this holding has left lower courts struggling to properly apply the Fourth 
Amendment to other forms of personal data.13 
In its essence, the difficulty that Carpenter created appears to stem 
from applying two legal fictions to protect location data: (1) the Katz 
test; and (2) the premise that privacy rights—not property 
rights—apply to personal data.  The law as written and the sensibilities 
of the people diverge—the law on the books says that the Fourth 
Amendment only protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” but the 
law in action says that it also protects reasonable expectations of 
privacy; the law on the books says only privacy rights extend to personal 
data, but the law in action says personal data is property.14 
 
 
 8 Infra Section III.A. 
 9 Infra Section III.B. 
 10 Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the 
Evolving Fourth Amendment, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 110 (2017–2018). 
 11 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (5-4 decision). 
 12 Id. at 2219. 
 13 See Allison Grande, Location Privacy Warrant Lines Still Murky After Carpenter, 
LAW360 (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1189523 (“[T]he [C]ourt 
left open whether the requirement applies to other categories of sensitive digital data, 
such as real-time cellphone records, internet browsing histories, toll transactions and 
smart meter usage.”). 
 14 American legislatures have not explicitly granted property-status to personal 
data; however, state legislatures are increasingly treating personal data as property 
under data privacy laws.  See, e.g., Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008) (allowing for a cause of action even where no actual injury 
occurred—a violation of statutory protection of biometric information alone suffices to 
establish standing); California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020) (granting individuals the right to have their 
personal information deleted). 
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Legal fictions “soon get into the books and become part of the law 
as it is written.”15  This Comment analyzes the implications of classifying 
personal data as property under the Fourth Amendment.  Doing so could 
relieve the judicial system of the confusion caused by applying two legal 
fictions to personal data under the Fourth Amendment.  Law 
enforcement could benefit from a categorical rule as to when a warrant 
is required.  Recognizing personal data as property under the Fourth 
Amendment could also benefit individuals by ensuring that the Fourth 
Amendment will protect their personal data from unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
The expansion of state data privacy laws provides a basis that could 
allow the Supreme Court to find that state legislatures have implicitly 
recognized a property right in personal data; as such, when an 
appropriate case or controversy arises, the Court could hold that 
personal data is property that the Fourth Amendment protects.  
Employing legal fictions—the reasonable expectation of privacy test16 
and classifying personal data as an object of privacy rights 
alone—would no longer be necessary to apply the Fourth Amendment 
to personal data.  In theory, this could allow for predictable warrant 
requirements and a consistent administration of justice.  But personal 
data is complex.  Issues arise as to its proper definition and to whom 
data should belong.17 
This Comment examines the possibility that personal data could be 
brought under the Fourth Amendment as a form of property.  Part II of 
this Comment analyzes the Court’s decision in Carpenter and discusses 
the difficulties that this decision has created.  Part III explores the text 
and history surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.  It then 
provides an overview of Katz and its progeny leading up to the Court’s 
decision in Carpenter.  In Part IV, this Comment explores how current 
and pending state data privacy legislation treat personal data as 
property.  This Part also explores various definitions of personal data 
and their implications for this analysis.  Part V considers whether 
recognizing personal data as property under the Fourth Amendment 
would heighten courts’ efficiency in applying the Fourth Amendment to 
 
 15 Pound, supra note 1, at 14. 
 16 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (setting forth the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 17 See Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the US, VARONIS (Mar. 29, 2020), 
https://www.varonis.com/blog/us-privacy-laws (comparing various definitions of 
personal information under proposed state data privacy laws); see also Stacy-Ann Elvy, 
Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 463 
(2018) (describing the question of data ownership or rights as a “vexing” question in the 
context of Internet of Things devices).  
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personal data.  This Part also explores the difficulty in defining “personal 
data” as property, given longstanding notions of the appropriate objects 
of property rights.  In Part VI, this Comment discusses consequences 
that may follow if state legislatures widely adopted the notion that 
personal data is property.  This Comment suggests that the states should 
continue to cautiously exercise their roles as laboratories, imparting 
piecemeal property rights to personal data and evaluating their impact.  
Part VII concludes that while a Supreme Court opinion holding that 
personal data is property under the Fourth Amendment could eliminate 
the need to resort to legal fictions in this context, the difficulties in 
defining which items of “personal data” qualify as property may leave 
courts no better off than using the Katz test. 
II.  CARPENTER’S CONTROVERSIAL PROTECTION OF HISTORIC CELL-SITE 
LOCATION INFORMATION 
In United States v. Carpenter, the Supreme Court divided on 
whether historic cell-site location information falls under the Fourth 
Amendment.18  The majority ruled that it does because individuals have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical 
movements.19  Four dissenters each authored separate opinions.  
Despite this divide among the dissenters, each invoked the concept of 
applying the Fourth Amendment to property interests.  If the Court 
recognized personal data as an effect belonging to the person to whom 
it pertains, the Court might have unanimously agreed that historic cell-
site location information is subject to the Fourth Amendment.  An 
analysis of each opinion follows. 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that acquiring a 
historic record of an individual’s movements over an extended period 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.20  This result was 
foreshadowed by dicta in United States v. Jones.21  At first, the Carpenter 
decision appeared to bring important Fourth Amendment protection to 
individuals in the modern-day era, but this impression quickly faded as 
 
 18 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 19 Id. at 2219. 
 20 Id. 
 21 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012). 
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courts demonstrated a reluctance to require a warrant for access to 
similar records.22 
The Court applied Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test to 
cell-site location information (CSLI), which revealed “the whole of 
[Carpenter’s] physical movements.”23  Additionally, the Court examined 
the nature of CSLI acquisition under a multifactor analysis that it had 
previously used to evaluate “such surveillance techniques as bugging, 
wiretaps, video surveillance, and email acquisitions” under the Fourth 
Amendment.24  When law enforcement officers acquired Carpenter’s 
CSLI, they accessed the whole of his physical movements in a hidden, 
continuous, indiscriminate, and intrusive manner.25  The Court found 
this method to be problematic because accessing CSLI provides a “near 
perfect” surveillance.26  By grasping onto Katz’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy test and supplementing its analysis by considering 
problematic surveillance methods, the Court managed to bring historic 
CSLI under the Fourth Amendment. 
This feat of judicial gymnastics ultimately achieved an outcome 
that many would regard as just, but it failed to provide an intelligible 
precedent for lower courts to follow.27  Essentially, the Court treated 
personal data as property by bringing it within the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment—a provision of our Constitution designed to protect 
persons, their houses, and their intimate personal property.28  Simply 
recognizing personal data as a form of property could have achieved the 
same result in an efficient and doctrinally sound manner if the Court 
were to take an agreeable approach to personal data. 
 
 
 22 See, e.g., Rick Aldrich, Privacy’s “Third-Party” Doctrine: Initial Developments in the 
Wake of Carpenter, 15 SCITECH LAW. 4, 6–7 (2019) (stating that most decisions that cite 
Carpenter’s holding do not suppress CSLI evidence); see also Grande, supra note 13. 
 23 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2219. 
 24 Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect 
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 219 (2018). 
 25 See id. at 221. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 22, at 6–7 (stating that most decisions that cite 
Carpenter’s holding do not suppress CSLI evidence); see also Grande, supra note 13. 
 28 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“For the majority, this case 
is apparently no different from one in which Government agents raided Carpenter’s 
home and removed records associated with his cell phone.”).  The third-party doctrine 
provides that individuals do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything 
disclosed to a third party. 
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In Smith v. Maryland29 and United States v. Miller,30 the government 
attempted to justify its warrantless access of Carpenter’s CSLI by 
turning to the third-party doctrine.31  This argument failed.32  The Court 
found that the third-party doctrine was ill-suited to handle “the 
exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by 
wireless carriers today.”33  While Smith and Miller address “limited 
types of personal information,” CSLI provides a comprehensive 
chronicle of personal information that implicates significantly greater 
privacy concerns.34  Further, the Court found that CSLI is not 
transmitted voluntarily.35  Rather, wireless providers automatically 
collect CSLI whenever a cell phone is connected to their network.36 
Carpenter limited the third-party doctrine, finding that it does not 
apply to CSLI because of the detailed, chronological nature of CSLI and 
the involuntary manner in which it is collected.37  Scholars suggest that 
this holding indicates that a warrant should be required when an 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in the records converts 
the records into the modern-day equivalent of an individual’s own 
papers or effects . . . whether [or not] those records are stored with . . . a 
third party.”38  While this suggestion achieves the desired result of 
avoiding the third-party doctrine, it suggests a complicated procedure 
to do so.  Rather than first debating whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their records, personal data could be 
categorically recognized as an “effect.”  This would impose a warrant 
requirement on personal data, eliminating normative judgments about 
which expectations of privacy are reasonable. 
 
 
 29 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 30 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 31 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 2219–20. 
 35 Id. at 2220 (“Cell phone location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally 
understands the term.”). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20; see also Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 218 
(“[T]he majority found that cell site records, due to their unique and revealing nature, 
were not subject to the third party doctrine of Smith and Miller.”). 
 38 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 226. 
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B.  The Dissenting Opinions 
Carpenter presented a contentious issue, which resulted in a 5-4 
split among the Justices.39  Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch 
dissented.40  Though each Justice made a distinct argument to reject the 
majority’s decision, one common theme ran through each dissenting 
opinion—an emphasis on property concepts.41 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, 
rested on the premise that the third-party doctrine should apply to 
CSLI.42  From Justice Kennedy’s perspective, the issue should have been 
addressed “by interpreting accepted property principles as the baseline 
for reasonable expectations of privacy.”43  Since Carpenter’s wireless 
provider created and retained the CSLI records, Justice Kennedy 
believed that the records should be regarded as the wireless provider’s 
property; therefore, the third-party doctrine should insulate them from 
the Fourth Amendment.44  Accordingly, acquiring CSLI records should 
then merely require a subpoena duces tecum.45 
Justice Thomas carefully parsed the text of the Fourth Amendment 
in his dissenting opinion.46  First, Justice Thomas drew attention to the 
word “their” from the phrase protecting individuals “from unreasonable 
searches of ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”47  Carpenter 
must prove the CSLI is his in order to come under the Fourth 
Amendment.48  This analysis stresses that “their” indicates that the key 
issue is “whose property was searched.”49  In addition to this assertion, 
Justice Thomas heavily criticizes Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy test as inconsistent with a proper understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment.50  Justice Thomas found that Carpenter’s claim failed under 
an approach focused strictly on property concepts.51  In his analysis, the 
Fourth Amendment’s close connection to property presents itself 
 
 39 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (5-4 decision). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See, e.g., id. at 2224, 2235, 2260 & 2268. 
 42 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24 at 218. 
 43 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235. 
 44 Id. at 2229–30. 
 45 See id. at 2235. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 2242. 
 49 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235. 
 50 Id. at 2236 (“The more fundamental problem with the Court’s opinion . . . is its use 
of the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test . . . .”); Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, 
at 218. 
 51 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 218. 
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through the text that limits protection to persons and “three specific 
types of property: ‘houses, papers, and effects.’”52  Since data is not 
recognized as one of these forms of property, Justice Thomas concluded 
the Fourth Amendment does not cover it.53 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented on the basis that 
the government may use a subpoena to acquire CSLI, subject to 
relevance review.54  From Justice Alito’s perspective, the majority erred 
by expanding the protection against an unreasonable search of one’s 
property to protect against an unreasonable search of a third party’s 
property.55  Justice Alito saw the majority’s decision as fracturing two 
“fundamental pillars of Fourth Amendment law.”56  First, conflating the 
distinction between a physical search and an order to produce 
documents.57  And second, “allow[ing] a defendant to object to the 
search of a third party’s property.”58  Justice Alito concluded his dissent 
by criticizing the majority’s “desire to make a statement about privacy 
in the digital age.”59  Whatever pragmatic value such a statement may 
have, the Honorable Justice Alito found it could “not justify the 
consequences that [the Carpenter] decision is likely to produce.”60 
Finally, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent presents not only a property-
based approach to the Fourth Amendment but also suggests how 
CSLI—and, by extension, other personal data—can be treated as 
property under the Fourth Amendment.61  Justice Gorsuch’s analysis of 
how personal data can be treated as property begins by noting that 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test “only ‘supplements, rather 
than displaces the traditional property-based understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment.’”62  Having established the continued functionality 
of property concepts under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Gorsuch 
elaborates on the benefits that flow from taking a property-based 
approach.63 
 
 52 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 218. 
 55 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 2261. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–62 (introducing his analysis that sets aside Smith 
and Miller as ill-suited for the digital age, finding a retreat to Katz unnecessary, and then 
formulating how personal data can be treated as property under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 62 Id. at 2268 (quoting Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018)). 
 63 Id. at 2268–71. 
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According to Justice Gorsuch, a property-based approach fits more 
readily within judicial powers than the Katz test because it does not ask 
judges to make normative judgment calls about what should be 
private.64  Instead, judges are encouraged to consult the legislative 
branch and the common law to determine the people’s rights.65  Under 
a property-based approach, sharing data with a third party does not 
automatically eliminate an individual’s rights in that data.66  Rather, 
allowing a third party to hold data to process for some particular 
purpose is a bailment.67  The Fourth Amendment does not require 
complete ownership and exclusive control for protection under a 
property-based approach.68  Justice Gorsuch notes that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a person from an unreasonable search of her home 
whether or not she owns it in fee simple.69  Moreover, an approach based 
on property law “may help provide detailed guidance on evolving 
technologies without resort to judicial intuition.”70 
In this final dissent, Justice Gorsuch openly expresses sympathy for 
a Fourth Amendment protection argument based on property rights 
under the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999.71  
Carpenter’s failure to develop this argument in the courts below led 
Justice Gorsuch to dismiss its viability in the case before him.72  Perhaps 
intending to plant a seed for a future decision to grasp onto in 
recognizing property rights in personal data, Justice Gorsuch wrote: 
“Plainly, customers have substantial legal interests in [CSLI] including 
at least some right to include, exclude, and control its use.  Those 
interests might even rise to the level of a property right.”73  Seizing upon 
this statement and the implicit treatment of personal data as property 
under emerging state privacy laws, a future defendant may fare well 
making an argument for Fourth Amendment protection on the basis that 
personal data is an effect. 
 
 64 Id. at 2268. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id.  
 67 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (“A bailment is the ‘delivery of personal property by 
one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain 
purpose.’”). 
 68 See id. at 2269. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 2270 (“If state legislators or state courts say that a digital record has the 
attributes that normally make something property, that may supply a sounder basis for 
judicial decision making than judicial guesswork about societal expectations.”). 
 71 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 219. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (emphasis added). 
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III.  HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Carpenter Court relied upon the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test to protect historic cell-site location data.74  But how does a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” relate to the Fourth Amendment?  
And what exactly is a “reasonable expectation of privacy?”  Examining 
the origin of the Fourth Amendment, the Katz decision that set this test 
in motion, and cases on the path from Katz to Carpenter sheds light on 
these questions. 
A.  The Origin of the Fourth Amendment 
When the United States adopted the Fourth Amendment, American 
political leaders regarded Entick v. Carrington75 as “‘the true and 
ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with regard to search and 
seizure.”76  Entick places striking importance on respecting property 
rights, stating that under English law, “the property of every man [is] so 
sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without 
his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at 
all.”77  This reverence for property presents itself in the Fourth 
Amendment’s text.  The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.78 
This, however, was not the text of the original draft.79 
The Fourth Amendment’s first draft used the phrase “other 
property” where “effects” currently stands.80  Some debate exists as to 
whether this change had the impact of narrowing or expanding the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment,81 but recent scholars typically agree 
that the impact was to narrow its scope.82  The consensus is that the 
phrase “other property” indicates protection for real property, where 
 
 74 Id. at 2219. 
 75 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). 
 76 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). 
 77 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817. 
 78 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 79 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal 
Property its Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 984 (2016). 
 80 Id. at 984–85. 
 81 United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2241 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 82 Brady, supra note 79, at 985. 
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“effects” excludes real property and instead extends to personal 
property.83  “Effects meant, and means, ‘personal property.’”84  
Recognizing personal data as personal property places it squarely 
within the category of “effects,” facilitating an efficient route to the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections from unreasonable searches and 
seizures for personal data. 
But the question remains: can personal data be considered a form 
of personal property?  The answer appears to be “yes,” where personal 
data is rightly defined; therefore, it may qualify as an “effect.”  Much of 
the difficulty in applying the Fourth Amendment to personal data stems 
from the notion that data is intangible, so it cannot be considered 
property.  In Katz, the focus on finding a tangible substance to protect 
presents itself in Justice Black’s dissent.85  While Justice Black may be 
correct that a conversation overheard is not tangible, his analysis failed 
to make the significant distinction between a conversation that is 
merely overheard and one that is recorded, as was the case in Katz.86 
Many members of the scientific community accept the proposition 
that data is tangible.87  Taking this as a fact would allow personal data 
to comfortably align with the Fourth Amendment’s original intent to 
protect effects.  Digitized personal information would be tangible 
because, under this view, “[an] asset is tangible when recorded.”88  
Though the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test remains a valuable 
tool for affording Fourth Amendment protection where a strict 
property-based rationale does not apply, the Court may be able to move 
away from its reliance on legal fictions in this context by holding that 
personal data is an “effect.” 
 
 
 83 Id.  Brady explains that “[e]ach of the ordinary dictionaries cited by the modern 
Court as authority for the original meaning of the Constitution defines ‘effects’ to mean 
chattels or possessions.”  Id. 
 84 Id. at 1001. 
 85 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (“A conversation overheard by . . . 
wiretapping, is not tangible . . . .”). 
 86 Id. at 349. 
 87 See Ritter & Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving 
Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 223 (2018) (“[T]he scientific consensus [is] that 
digital information is not intangible, but is physical, tangible matter.”); see also id. at 256 
(“[T]he physical quality of information, and the idea that information is a physical 
constituent of the universe, are widely adopted within the scientific community.”). 
 88 Id. at 257.  
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B.  Analyzing Katz and Its Progeny 
To understand the decision in Carpenter, familiarity with the origin 
of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and its application in 
cases that are relevant to Carpenter’s holding is useful.  Since its 
inception, the reasonable expectation of privacy test has been met with 
criticism.89  The foundation of these objections is the Court’s departure 
from applying the Amendment to protect against unreasonable searches 
and seizures of property to broadly protecting privacy.90  On a 
fundamental level, critics contend that the Court exceeded its power in 
creating the Katz test.91  Nonetheless, the Court has continued to apply 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test to achieve just outcomes 
when faced with cases that could not have otherwise been brought 
under the Fourth Amendment.92 
In Katz, the petitioner objected to the government’s use of a 
recorded conversation at trial.93  FBI agents had made the recording by 
placing a recording device outside of a telephone booth that Katz used 
to make a telephone call.94  Katz erroneously argued that the telephone 
booth was a constitutionally protected area in an attempt to qualify for 
Fourth Amendment protection.95  The Court rejected this argument, 
noting that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”96  
Despite the government’s arguments to the contrary, the Court held that 
the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures regardless of an individual’s location.97  According to the Court, 
a reading of the Fourth Amendment that excluded protection for 
 
 89 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting) (“My basic objection is twofold: (1) 
I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by 
today’s decision, and (2) I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite 
the Amendment in order ‘to bring it into harmony with the times’ and thus reach a result 
that many people believe to be desirable.”). 
 90 See id. at 373. 
 91 Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (“I will not distort the words of the Amendment . . . .  It 
was never meant that this Court have such power, which in effect would make us a 
continuously functioning constitutional convention.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (recognizing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of one’s physical movements revealed by 
historic CSLI); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (warrant required to search 
cell phones given reasonable expectations of privacy in the large quantities of personal 
information stored on cell phones); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) 
(stating in dicta that secretive long-term monitoring of a person’s vehicle would violate 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 93 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 349–50. 
 96 Id. at 351. 
 97 Id. at 359. 
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conversations in telephone booths would improperly disregard the 
importance of the public telephone in conducting private 
conversations.98 
The reasonable expectation of privacy test emerged in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence.99  In its original formulation, the test had two 
requirements: (1) an individual actually possesses a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the matter at issue; and (2) that expectation is 
one that society would recognize as reasonable.100  Over time, the Court 
has simplified the test by minimizing the first prong and looking merely 
at whether society would find an expectation of privacy reasonable 
under the circumstances of a given case.101  In application, this is a 
normative test that requires judges to decide what should be private.102  
Critics vehemently oppose this result because it is impermissible for 
judges to substitute their judgment as to what should be protected for 
that of the legislature.103 
The Katz decision might have come out differently if a property-
based rationale had been applied.  This case involved the FBI creating a 
digital record of an individual’s conversation without his knowledge or 
consent.104  This recorded conversation could be considered personal 
data under a broad understanding of what constitutes “personal 
data,”105 but personal data definitions vary.106  The potential outcomes 
under a property rationale differ starkly when taking account of these 
different definitions. 
 
 98 Id. at 352. 
 99 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 100 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 101 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 102 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 221–22. 
 103 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The reasonable 
expectation of privacy test] invites courts to make judgments about policy, not law.”); id. 
at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Deciding what privacy interests should be recognized 
. . . calls for the exercise of raw political will belonging to the legislatures, not the legal 
judgment proper to courts.”); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were with the excesses of 
governmental power, did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking 
authority as [to create a general right to privacy].  The history of governments proves 
that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.”). 
 104 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 105 See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020) (defining “personal 
information” as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable 
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a 
particular consumer or household”). 
 106 See Green, supra note 17. 
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First, there is the question of whether the recorded conversation 
qualifies as “personal information” at all, and then, if so, to whom it 
belongs.  If the conversation is not viewed as personal information, then 
the recording would likely be viewed as the government’s property, and 
Katz would fail to invoke Fourth Amendment protection.  If it is viewed 
as personal information, it might belong to Katz, the person he spoke 
with, both of them, or—yet again—the government because the 
government created the recording.  Katz would only be successful under 
a property-based approach if the recorded conversation were viewed as 
personal information belonging to Katz.  Under this approach, Katz’s 
recorded conversation would be his effect; accordingly, the government 
would need a warrant to search or seize it.  Taking a property-based 
approach in lieu of the Katz test could similarly disrupt the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in cases that followed Katz. 
The first case following Katz that is relevant to Carpenter is United 
States v. Miller.107  Miller is largely responsible for the “third-party 
doctrine,” which postulates that a person has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in data voluntarily conveyed to a third party.108  To comply 
with the Bank Secrecy Act,109 Miller’s bank retained his financial 
transaction records.110  The government suspected that Miller was 
illegally operating a distillery and failing to pay proper taxes.111  The 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau accessed Miller’s financial 
records at two banks where he was a customer with subpoenas rather 
than warrants.112  The Court found that Miller’s bank records were not 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because a person can 
maintain no reasonable expectation of privacy in records voluntarily 
conveyed to a third party.113 
Like the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the third-party 
doctrine has received harsh criticism since its origin.114  One source of 
this criticism comes from the fallacy of assuming that records are 
 
 107 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 108 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 109 12 U.S.C. § 1829(d) (2012). 
 110 Miller, 425 U.S. at 436. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 437. 
 113 Id. at 442–43. 
 114 See id. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 
3d 238 (1974)) (“To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon his 
request, without any judicial control . . . opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of 
very real abuses of police power.”); see also id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(proposing that retaining records pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act is itself an 
unconstitutional seizure; therefore, law enforcement cannot constitutionally access 
these records). 
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voluntarily conveyed.115  Reliance on property rights may have avoided 
these difficulties because the information conveyed to a third party for 
a limited purpose could be considered a bailment—a transfer of 
possession for a certain limited purpose without surrendering 
ownership rights.116 
Under a property-based theory, Miller may or may not have come 
out differently.  The Court could have found that the seizure of Miller’s 
financial records violated the Fourth Amendment because Miller held 
property rights in those records although the bank possessed them for 
certain limited purposes.  Alternatively, the Court may have found that 
the government’s access to Miller’s financial records was lawful because 
the search or seizure was reasonable.  Keep in mind that the Fourth 
Amendment only prohibits those searches and seizures of persons, 
houses, papers, or effects that rise to the level of unreasonable.117  It is 
feasible that the Court would have concluded that Congress, in enacting 
the Bank Secrecy Act, properly recognized that a search or seizure is 
reasonable under these circumstances.  On the other hand, employing a 
property-based rationale could have led to Miller’s records being the 
bank’s property.  Miller would not be able to assert a Fourth 
Amendment right to his bank records if they were deemed the bank’s 
property. 
Smith v. Maryland118 is the next case relevant to Carpenter.  This 
case is analogous to Miller, as it also involves warrantless access to 
information conveyed to a third party.119  In Smith, the Court held that 
Smith had voluntarily assumed the risk that the phone company would 
convey the phone numbers he dialed to law enforcement.120  Because 
Smith had assumed that risk, the Court found that he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the records of phone numbers that he had 
dialed.121 
 
 115 Id. at 451(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 
238 (1974)) (“For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or business firms 
of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to 
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank 
account.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746–47 (1979) (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 387 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that records of 
phone numbers that an individual dials are not truly voluntarily conveyed given the 
“vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication[s]”). 
 116 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
 117 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 118 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979). 
 119 See id. at 745–46. 
 120 Id. at 744. 
 121 Id. at 745. 
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Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that people do have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers that they dial.122  
Justice Marshall also dissented, powerfully articulating the dangers of 
unregulated government monitoring: “Permitting governmental access 
to telephone records on less than probable cause may thus impede 
certain forms of political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are 
the hallmark of a truly free society.”123  To the majority, however, the 
third-party doctrine dictated the result—the government would not be 
required to obtain a warrant before accessing an individual’s records at 
the telephone company.124 
Smith attempted to argue that the Court should find his expectation 
of privacy reasonable because he had made calls without a live 
operator.125  These calls were processed through switching equipment 
that could only “remember” numbers if programmed to do so.126  The 
Court rejected this argument, noting the “crazy quilt” of a rule that 
would result if petitioner’s suggestion were adopted.127  The Court’s 
desire to avoid “mak[ing] a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment”128 is 
admirable, but continuing to apply the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test with the third-party doctrine at times appears to do just 
that. 
Congress responded to the issues in Smith with legislation.  The Pen 
Register Statute,129 requires the government to obtain a court order 
prior to installing a pen register.130  While this allows the use of pen 
registers without requiring a warrant, the government must 
demonstrate that “the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”131  This Congressional enactment 
reflects the fact pen register data falls outside of the current 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s scope. 
 
 122 Id. at 747. 
 123 Id. at 751. 
 124 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
 125 Id. at 745. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 745 (“We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, 
especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be dictated 
by billing practices of a private corporation.”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012). 
 130 BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE CRIMINAL LAW § 4:20 RIGHT OF PRIVACY—PEN REGISTERS 
(2019). 
 131 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). 
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Next, the case of United States v. Jones132 warrants discussion.  Jones 
is more analogous to the facts at issue in Carpenter, as it is the first case 
where the Court begins to address law enforcement’s use of modern 
surveillance technology.133  In Jones, the government installed a global 
positioning system (GPS) device on Jones’s wife’s car after its warrant 
to do so expired.134  In addition, the warrant only authorized 
government action in the District of Columbia, but the government 
attached the GPS device when the car was in Maryland.135  Ultimately, 
the Court decided this case based on physical trespass into the vehicle, 
but “five justices agreed that a surreptitious long-term monitoring of the 
vehicle also impinged on reasonable expectations of privacy, even if 
those movements were in public view.”136  Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority: “[i]t is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term 
is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.”137 
The Jones Court’s reliance on the right to be free from physical 
trespass (despite recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
dicta) reveals a preference for a property-based rationale over Katz’s 
legal fiction.  If the two stood on equal ground, the Court could have held 
the Fourth Amendment was violated on both grounds, but it did not.  
The Jones Court avoided the problematic reasonable expectation of 
privacy test entirely in its holding and merely paid homage to Katz’s 
precedent in dicta.138 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a powerful concurrence that cautions 
against permitting an overly permeating police surveillance.139  
“Awareness that the government may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms. . . . GPS monitoring . . . may ‘alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to 
democratic society.’”140  Justice Sotomayor went on to question whether 
the third-party doctrine should be reconsidered, as it is “ill suited to the 
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
 
 132 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 133 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 216. 
 134 Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03. 
 135 Id. at 403. 
 136 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 216–17. 
 137 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 138 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 222 n.152 (“The Jones Court recognized that 
nontrespassory acquisitions of location data would involve a Katz analysis, but it put off 
conducting that analysis and the ‘thorny problems’ associated with it for another day.”). 
 139 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 140 Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
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tasks.”141  Indeed, recognizing that personal data is personal 
property—as an effect subject to Fourth Amendment protection—could 
alleviate these concerns.  There would be no need to invoke the third-
party doctrine and the Katz test under a property-based rationale taking 
this approach to personal data. 
A final case worth considering on the path from Katz to Carpenter 
is Riley v. California.142  Riley objected to law enforcement’s search of the 
data on his cell phone after he was arrested.143  Generally, the law 
recognizes a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment for a search 
incident to an arrest.144  The Court’s holding narrowed this exception to 
exclude searching the data stored on cell phones.145  Cell phones have a 
unique tendency to store vast amounts of personal information.  This 
served as the foundation for the Court’s decision to exempt cell phone 
data from the traditional Fourth Amendment exception for searches 
incident to an arrest.146  The Court recognized the widespread use of cell 
phones in American society and the pervasive nature of the personal 
information that these devices typically store.147 
California attempted to argue for a limited warrant requirement 
for cell phone searches on a variety of grounds.148  Ultimately, the Court 
decided to impose a general categorical restriction on searches of cell 
phone data incident to arrest.149  The Court emphasized the need to 
provide clear guidance to law enforcement in order to avoid “a difficult 
line-drawing expedition.”150 
 
 141 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417. 
 142 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 143 See id. at 378–79. 
 144 Aldrich, supra note 22, at 5. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 217; Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (“Cell phones . . . 
place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals. . . . 
[O]fficers must generally secure a warrant before conducting [a search of data on a cell 
phone].”). 
 147 Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 (“[M]any of the more than 90% of American adults who own 
a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their 
lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”). 
 148 Id. at 398–400 (allowing searches of arrestee’s cell phones if officers limited to 
“areas of the phone where an officer reasonably believes that information relevant to 
the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be discovered,” the call log, and “if 
[officers] could have obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.”). 
 149 Id. at 398 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)) (“[I]f 
police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in 
large part be done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by 
individual police officers.’”). 
 150 Id. at 401. 
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Recognizing that personal data is personal property would be 
consistent with the Court’s desire to provide a clear categorical rule.  
The failure to do so has left lower courts reluctant to require a warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment in cases involving search and seizure of 
personal data after Carpenter.151  In an effort to be prudent, courts are 
interpreting Carpenter narrowly.152  While not requiring a warrant to 
search and seize personal data may avoid an impediment in law 
enforcement’s ease of access to such data, it is likely causing more harm 
than good by subjecting citizens to unreasonable search and seizure of 
their personal data.  Accepting personal data as an effect could provide 
clear notice to law enforcement that a warrant is required to search or 
seize these sensitive digital records—helping to secure individuals’ 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in the digital era. 
IV.  PERSONAL DATA IS TREATED AS PROPERTY UNDER STATE DATA PRIVACY 
LAWS 
“[T]he divergence between the law in books and law in action is 
more acute in some periods of legal history than in others.”153  Scholars 
argue that “data has now become a new kind of property—an asset that 
is created, manufactured, processed, stored, transferred, licensed, sold, 
and stolen.”154  In today’s rapidly advancing technological era, courts 
and legislatures grapple with protecting personal data.155  Under the 
guise of increasingly expansive privacy laws, state legislatures are 
imparting property rights in personal data. 
It is not within the province of the Court to decide what property 
rights should be.  State legislatures and the common law are typically 
responsible for both creating and safeguarding individuals’ property 
rights.156  But what has yet gone unnoticed is the fact that the states are 
 
 151 See Grande, supra note 13 (“[d]istrict courts have been reluctant to require 
warrants for access to digital records beyond the historical cellphone location data 
covered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s [Carpenter] decision.”); see also Aldrich, supra note 
22, at 7 (discussing United States v. Oakes, No. 3:16-cr-00196 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 2018), 
where the court denied Fourth Amendment protection to access of a defendant’s 
location through search and seizure of CSLI under the premise that Carpenter only 
applied to CSLI related to one’s phone). 
 152 See Grande, supra note 13; see also Aldrich, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
 153 Pound, supra note 1, at 22.   
 154 Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 221. 
 155 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (historic cell-site 
location information); see also Riley, 573 U.S. 373 (data stored on a smartphone); Illinois 
Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008); CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020). 
 156 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (stating that protection 
of persons’ property is mainly the responsibility of state legislatures); see also Pamela 
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beginning to grant property rights in personal data while continuing to 
apply the label of “privacy.”  State legislatures employ a legal fiction by 
speaking of personal data as if it were only protected by privacy 
rights—but their actions continually extend property rights to personal 
data.  The Court could take notice of this reality and recognize that 
personal data is a form of property protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Waiting for the legislatures to make the leap to reclassify 
personal data as property may be a mistake, as the risks that come with 
changes in law stymie change even in the face of pressing reasons to 
alter the law.157 
A.  Privacy vs. Property: What’s the Difference? 
While privacy says “you cannot see” or “you cannot know,” 
property says “you cannot possess, use, or modify.”158  Louis D. Brandeis 
and Samuel D. Warren’s The Right to Privacy159 is the seminal work on 
privacy scholarship.160  In their article, Brandeis and Warren describe a 
privacy right as “the right to one’s personality.”161  Privacy allows 
individuals to maintain their unique, authentic selves by providing a 
shield from unwanted criticism.  The scholars explain that the right to 
privacy applies to “personal writings and any other productions of the 
intellect or of the emotions.”162  They argue that “privacy for thoughts, 
emotions, and sensations . . . should receive the same protection, 
whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in 
attitudes, or in a facial expression.”163  According to these scholars’ 
 
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1142 (2000) (“Grants 
of property rights are generally the province of state law.”).  See generally Carol M. Rose, 
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 77 (1985) (discussing various 
theories of property that emerged from the common law). 
 157 See Pound, supra note 1, at 14; see also Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 223 
(arguing that deference to the legislature is a flawed approach because Congress 
“recognized the cell phone tracking problem but was content to legislate on the margins, 
deferring to courts on the hard question of legal standards”). 
 158 Compare Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal 
Information Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 307, 311–14 (2008) (noting the prevailing philosophical justifications for 
privacy being to “avoid unwilling exposure of personal information” and protect “the 
desire for freedom from observation”), with Brady, supra note 79, at 994 (“Personal 
property gives its owner a right to exclude others from possessing, using, and interfering 
with the effect.”). 
 159 Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 160 See Newman, supra note 158, at 310. 
 161 Brandeis & Warren, supra note 159, at 207. 
 162 Id. at 213. 
 163 Id. at 206. 
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thesis, objects of privacy are incorporeal, though they may be embodied 
in various media.  In general, a privacy right functions to exclude others 
from nonconsensual access to the object of the privacy interest.164 
There are a number of philosophical justifications for privacy.165  
Three of the major philosophical justifications for privacy apply 
specifically to personal information privacy.166  The first deals with 
“socialization and freedom from unwilling exposure.”167  Under this 
theory, privacy functions to preserve the personality.168  By placing 
limits on others’ access to oneself, an individual can avoid social 
pressure to change.169  Additionally, privacy plays an important role in 
socialization by facilitating intimate relationships.170  Privacy allows an 
individual to create a realm of secret information known only to those 
specially selected to share in intimacy. 
The second relevant philosophical justification for privacy in one’s 
personal information is “interiority and freedom from observation.”171  
This theory provides that privacy benefits individuals by allowing for 
secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.172  “Interiority” allows an individual to 
exercise critical thought free from social pressure, and it is the pre-
requisite for self-reflection.173  This gives individuals the ability to 
develop challenges to popular ideas, formulate unique perspectives, and 
develop a strong sense of self. 
The third philosophical justification for privacy in personal 
information relates, not to an individual’s benefit, but to the benefit of 
society.174  Through privacy, individuals gain the freedom that allows for 
the development and contribution of unique perspectives to public 
debate.175  From this perspective, the ultimate beneficiary of privacy 
rights is not the individual but society as a whole.  In all three theories, 
there is a volitional aspect to the object of the privacy right.  Privacy is 
protecting the product of one’s thoughts and emotions from scrutiny 
 
 164 See Newman, supra note 158, at 311 (noting that “the concept of consent is a 
common thread, of varying degrees of import, underlying all three [main philosophical 
justifications for privacy]”). 
 165 See id. at 310–11.   
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. at 311. 
 168 Newman, supra note 158, at 311. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See id. at 312. 
 171 Id. at 314. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. at 315. 
 174 Newman, supra note 158, at 317. 
 175 Id. 
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and pressure to change.  If violated, the objects of privacy may cease to 
exist, as one may abandon unpopular ideas, avoid expression of quirky 
personality traits, or neglect to pursue curious endeavors. 
Moving from an analysis of privacy to an analysis of property, keep 
in mind the volitional nature of the objects of privacy rights, and note 
the contrast in the nature of the objects of property rights.  Broadly 
speaking, the concept of property encompasses all that an individual 
possesses.176  From this standpoint, an individual’s real property, 
chattel, intangible products of the mind, privileges, and 
rights—including the right to privacy—are all objects of property.177  If 
the objects being protected have a volitional nature, the shift from the 
broad category of property into the subset of privacy is justified.  The 
protections given by a privacy right protect this volitional nature by 
preventing unwanted exposure and freedom from observation.  
Property rights generally apply to static objects, both tangible and 
intangible, with an exception for the subset of objects of privacy.178  
Under the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether personal data is 
properly protected by privacy rights (and, therefore, can only be 
brought under the Fourth Amendment through the use of the Katz test), 
or whether personal data properly belongs among the more general 
objects of property rights entitled to direct, categorical protection from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
A “property right” is essentially “the right to exclude.”179  
Pragmatically, there is a difference between the function of property 
rights and privacy rights.  Privacy functions to avoid unwanted exposure 
or observation.180  Property functions to prevent unwanted possession, 
use, and interference with its objects.181  Examining emerging trends in 
data privacy law reveals the fact that personal data is not merely being 
shielded from exposure or observation; rather, it is being protected 
from unwanted possession, use, and interference.  While state 
legislatures have not gone so far as to declare a property right in 
personal data, likely due to the practical difficulties that may arise with 
 
 176 See Brandeis & Warren, supra note 159, at 193. 
 177 Id. 
 178 See id. (stating that the original objects of a property interest were “lands” and 
“cattle” but noting that the concept property has grown to encompass intangible objects 
as well). 
 179 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783 (2007). 
 180 Newman, supra note 158, at 311–14. 
 181 Brady, supra note 79, at 994. 
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doing so,182 the Court need not overlook what is actually happening.  
Personal data is being treated as property under state data privacy laws. 
Perhaps the reason that state legislatures have not classified 
personal data as property stems from the difficulty of reconciling 
personal data with preexisting notions of property.  The doctrine of first 
possession awards property rights to one who first provides “notice to 
the world through a clear act.”183  Inherent in this theory is a reward for 
useful labor.184  Take, for example, the classic case of Pierson v. Post.185  
In Pierson, the court awarded property rights to an interloper who shot 
a fox as it was being pursued by another hunter.186  The majority found 
that the property right belonged to the individual who executed a clear 
act evidencing “an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to 
his individual use.”187  The court rewarded the labor that went into 
hunting the fox by holding that the act created a property right. 
Scholars argue that personal data should belong to the person to 
whom it relates.188  Indeed, this is the effect given by state data privacy 
laws.189  But the person whom personal data relates to often exercises 
little or no labor in creating the data.  Biometric identifiers are 
immutable physical traits that individuals carry throughout life (retinal 
patterns, fingerprints, face geometry, etc.).  Some personal identifiers 
are assigned to individuals at birth (first name, last name, and social 
security number).  Other forms of personal data are created through 
copious amounts of labor on the part of companies recording the data, 
and only incidentally by the actions of individuals to whom the data 
relates (internet browsing history, search history, CSLI, etc.). 
Granting property status to personal data is at odds with the labor-
based notion of property.  Nonetheless, legislatures are beginning to 
treat personal data as if it were property that belonged to the individual 
to whom it relates.  The Court may take notice of this fact and hold that 
personal data is also property under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
following Section explores the ways that state data privacy laws treat 
personal data as property. 
 
 
 182 Infra Part VI. 
 183 Rose, supra note 156, at 77. 
 184 Id. 
 185 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805). 
 186 Id. at 178. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 229–30; see also Elvy, supra note 17, at 463 
n.210.  
 189 See infra Section IV.B. 
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B.  Property Protections for Personal Data Under State Data Privacy 
Laws 
1.  Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2002 
As technology advances, the amount and nature of personal data 
available continue to increase.  The Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act of 2008190 (BIPA) was the first state legislation to grant 
heightened protection to a new class of highly sensitive personal 
data—biometric identifiers.  Today six states (Illinois, Texas, New York, 
Arkansas, California, and Washington) have a law protecting biometric 
information.191  BIPA is significant because it treats biometric identifiers 
like property by providing for a cause of action on a statutory violation 
alone; there is no need to establish a separate injury for the law to 
recognize that rights have been violated.192  Recall that Entick,193 the 
reputed ultimate expression of the law on search and seizure at the time 
drafters wrote the Fourth Amendment,194 provides that “the property of 
every man [is] so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his 
neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though 
he does no damage at all.”195  This special protection afforded to 
property differs from the general requirement for a concrete injury in 
fact.196  BIPA stands as the first prominent example of affording an 






 190 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008). 
 191 The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What Companies Need to Know in 2020, THE 
NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/anatomy-
biometric-laws-what-us-companies-need-to-know-2020. 
 192 Rosengrant v. Six Flags, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019) (“[A]n individual need 
not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights 
under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek 
liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”).   
 193 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). 
 194 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). 
 195 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817. 
 196 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (finding the plaintiff failed to 
allege a concrete injury under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, when the 
defendant published inaccurate data about him in its credit reporting service). 
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2.  The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
Traditionally, the U.S. approach to data privacy has focused on 
regulating the actions of entities that collect data rather than providing 
individuals with control over the use of their data.197  The California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018198 (CCPA) disrupted this trend, and a 
number of states are ramping up to follow suit.199  The CCPA set a 
revolutionary precedent for United States privacy laws.  California has a 
history of influencing other state legislatures to enact progressive laws 
as citizens’ needs change in response to modern innovations.200  Other 
states have already begun drafting comprehensive personal data 
privacy laws modeled after the CCPA.201 
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
influenced the CCPA’s protections.202  Both the GDPR and the CCPA 
provide personal data with protections traditionally afforded to 
property, rather than the simple protections from unwanted access or 
observation germane to privacy rights.  The GDPR provides citizens of 
the European Union with protection from “unwanted possession”—”the 
right to be forgotten”203 by deletion of personal data on request; 
“unwanted use”—”the right to object”204 to unwanted data processing; 
and “unwanted interference”—”the right to rectification”205 if personal 
data is inaccurate or incomplete.206  The CCPA extends two of these 
three traditional property rights to personal data: “unwanted 
possession” through the right to deletion;207 and “unwanted use” by the 
right to object208 to third-party data processing.209  These provisions 
 
 197 Newman, supra note 158, at 319. 
 198 CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020). 
 199 See Catherine Barrett, Are the EU GDPR and the California CCPA Becoming the De 
Facto Global Standards for Data Privacy and Protection?, 15 SCITECH LAWYER 24, 27 
(Spring 2019) (observing that the CCPA elevates protection in personal data privacy to 
a fundamental right); see also Green, supra note 17. 
 200 See Barrett, supra note 199, at 27 (“California laws often serve as a model for other 
state legislatures.”). 
 201 See Green, supra note 17. 
 202 Sarah Hospelhorn, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) vs. GDPR, VARONIS (June 
17, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/ccpa-vs-gdpr. 
 203 Directive 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (119) 1,13. [hereinafter “GDPR”]. 
 204 Id. art. 21. 
 205 Id. art. 16. 
 206 Barrett, supra note 199, at 27. 
 207 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.105 (West 2020). 
 208 Id. § 1798.120. 
 209 Barrett, supra note 199, at 27. 
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vest individuals not with privacy rights but with ownership rights in 
their personal data.210 
3.  Comprehensive State Personal Data Privacy Legislation 
Outside of California 
Like the CCPA, other states are moving to enact data privacy laws 
that give individuals increased control over their personal data.211  The 
right to delete is included in pending bills in New York, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and Hawaii.212  This right goes to the core concept of 
property—excluding others from unwanted possession.213  Contrast 
this with privacy’s protection from unwanted access to prevent 
undesired criticism, humiliation, or pressure to change.  These state 
laws do not merely require businesses to cease processing personal 
data, which would be sufficient to protect privacy rights; they require 
deletion—completely relinquishing possession. 
Some states’ proposed bills go even further than the CCPA in terms 
of granting their citizens implicit property rights in personal data.  
Similar to BIPA, Massachusetts’s proposed bill includes a private right 
of action for any violation of the law, irrespective of whether an 
individual suffered any actual “loss of money or property as a result of 
the violation.”214  In New York’s proposed bill, any violation at all 
constitutes grounds for a private right of action.215  New York also vests 
citizens with a right to correct information held about them.216  This is a 
“right to rectification”—the property protection allowing individuals to 
be free from unwanted interference that is found in the GDPR.217  
Additionally, New York creates a “data fiduciary” role imposing upon 
businesses a duty to “exercise the duty of care, loyalty and 
confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the 
personal data of a consumer against a privacy risk; and . . . act in the best 
interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the entity, 
controller or data broker.”218  New York’s proposed law goes on to 
provide a broad right to opt-out of personal data processing, in contrast 
to the right to opt-out of personal information sales found in the 
 
 210 Hospelhorn, supra note 202. 
 211 See Green, supra note 17. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179. 
 214 Green, supra note 17. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 GDPR, supra note 203, art. 16. 
 218 Green, supra note 17. 
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CCPA.219  Maryland’s law surpasses the CCPA’s protections by requiring 
disclosure of all personal data shared with third parties, even if 
provided for free.220 
Presently, state laws governing the treatment of personal data are 
undergoing a metamorphosis.  Our nation is at a point where an implicit 
treatment of personal data as property is emerging.  The origin of this 
change is visible in BIPA, where an individual can sustain a cause of 
action without showing injury in fact.  The CCPA and copycat statutes on 
the horizon take the property-like treatment of personal data to the next 
level by granting protections against unwanted possession, use, and 
interference.  The Court could use these state laws as a basis for 
recognizing personal data as personal property—an “effect”—under the 
Fourth Amendment.  This could allow for smooth and consistent 
protection for personal data from warrantless search and seizure. 
C.  State Data Privacy Laws Apply to Objects Suited for Property 
Rights 
To decide whether property rights or privacy rights are best suited 
to protect a given object, a relevant consideration is whether the object 
of the right is the product of one’s volition, such that one would benefit 
from preventing unwilling exposure or observation.221  As explained 
above, state data privacy laws purport to provide privacy rights, but in 
effect, afford protections given to property.222  The case for finding that 
personal data is property is strengthened by recognizing that the objects 
of these data privacy laws are better classified as property. 
BIPA covers “biometric identifiers.”223  The definition of “biometric 
identifiers” includes “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan 
of hand or face geometry.”224  “Biometric information” includes “any 
information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or 
shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an 
individual.”225  Each of these items is static, hence the usefulness of 
biometric identifiers in identifying an individual.  The concerns for 
protecting these objects do not stem from a desire to avoid exposure or 
observation for fear of humiliation or undue social pressure to change; 
 
 219 U.S. State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY 
PROFESSIONALS: PRIVACY TRACKER (Apr. 18, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/us-state-
comprehensive-privacy-law-comparison/. 
 220 Green, supra note 17. 
 221 See supra Section IV.A. 
 222 See supra Section IV.B. 
 223 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008). 
 224 Id. § 10.  
 225 Id. 
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rather, the concerns for protecting this information stem from the 
desire to control possession, use, and interference with this highly 
sensitive personal data.226  If a nefarious party were to possess another 
individual’s biometric identifiers wrongfully, that individual could be 
subjected to tampering with financial records, security screenings, and 
identity theft.227  BIPA is one example illustrating the fact that classifying 
personal data as an object of privacy rather than property is a legal 
fiction. 
The CCPA also includes objects more readily described as objects 
of property rights than of privacy rights.  Under the CCPA, “personal 
information” is  “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is 
reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or 
household.”228  The statute includes a list of examples, including a real 
name, postal address, records of personal property, biometric 
information, internet browsing history, search history, and geolocation 
data.229  The protections extend beyond objects sure to identify an 
individual to “probabilistic identifiers” defined as “the identification of 
a consumer or a device to a degree of certainty of more probable than 
not based on any categories of personal information included in, or 
similar to, the categories enumerated in the definition of personal 
information.”230  The CCPA excludes publicly available information.231 
The CCPA includes an expansive definition of personal information.  
Many of the CCPA’s objects have little or nothing to do with an 
individual’s thoughts or emotions—biometric identifiers, postal 
address, real name, and records of personal property.  The stated 
purpose and intent of the CCPA is to “further Californians’ right to 
privacy by giving consumers an effective way to control their personal 
information.”232  But individuals are being given control over these 
objects for the purpose of controlling their use and possession.233  
Granted, some of the objects that fall under the CCPA’s expansive 
definition of privacy may rightly be thought of as objects best suited for 
privacy protections (internet search and browsing histories, for 
 
 226 Id. § 5(g) (“The public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating 
the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of 
biometric identifiers and information.”). 
 227 Id. § 5. 
 228 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020). 
 229 Id. § 1798.140(o)(1). 
 230 Id. § 1798.140(p). 
 231 Id. § 1798.140(o)(2). 
 232 2017 Cal. AB 375 § 2(i) (June 28, 2018). 
 233 See supra Section IV.B. 
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example).  The fact that there are mixed objects and mixed motives 
under the CCPA does not detract from the fact that an implicit grant of 
property status is given to personal information.  The protections 
afforded to all objects of the CCPA are those generally afforded to 
property. 
Tellingly, even the CCPA’s exclusion of publicly available 
information is consistent with an understanding that personal 
information is treated as property for Fourth Amendment purposes.  In 
Oliver v. United States,234 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect “open fields” from warrantless searches by law 
enforcement.235  Publicly available information is analogous to an open 
field in that an individual does not share the same intimate connection 
with publicly available information as with information known only by 
oneself and an intentionally selected group of others.  Further, open 
fields are not “effects,” as an “effect” is an item of personal, not real 
property.236  Excluding publicly available information from 
classification as an effect is consistent with this premise. 
Legislatures have been cautious in extending property rights to 
personal data.  They are doing so by developing the legal fiction that 
stretches privacy rights to afford protections never before given by 
privacy law to objects never before subject to privacy law.  While these 
laws will serve to give individuals heightened protection, more is 
needed to ensure individuals’ personal data is secured from abuse.  The 
states may be best advised to continue using the legal fiction of 
expanding the concept of privacy, as explained in Part VI below; 
however, the Court could recognize personal data as property to afford 
Fourth Amendment protection to personal information in order to allow 
for the efficient administration of justice, to provide clear notice to law 
enforcement as to warrant requirements and ensure individuals’ 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
V.  PROMOTING EFFICIENCY IN APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“The face of the law may be saved by an elaborate ritual, but men, 
and not rules, will administer justice.”237  The Court stretched the text of 
the Fourth Amendment to create the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test to administer justice when it had no other way to do so.  While this 
device may remain useful, perhaps even necessary in certain contexts, 
the time has arrived when the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
 
 234 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 235 Id. at 178–84. 
 236 Brady, supra note 79, at 1001. 
 237 Pound, supra note 1, at 20. 
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may no longer be needed to protect personal data from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Recognizing property rights in personal data 
would allow the Fourth Amendment to directly protect personal data 
from unreasonable search and seizure as an “effect.” 
Pound noted the problem with legal fictions long ago: “until the law 
has evolved some device by which [individuals] may use it in all cases 
the weak and friendless and lowly will be at a practical disadvantage, 
despite the legal theory.”238  As Pound observed, changes in law present 
risks.239  This fact results in legislatures hesitating before implementing 
needed changes in the law.240  Further, political tensions can hinder the 
legislative process, making it difficult for controversial new laws to pass.  
It may not be for many years, if ever, that the legislature outright 
declares personal data as property.  This leaves the most vulnerable 
members of society at the greatest risk of failing to receive protection 
for their personal data under the Fourth Amendment. 
Fortunately for individuals, the United States Supreme Court is 
now primed to grant protection to personal data by recognizing 
personal data as property belonging to the individual that it relates to.  
“Fourth Amendment law is constructed by the ‘concepts’ and 
‘understandings’ that derive from social life and myriad state laws 
. . . .”241  Following along this natural course, the Court may first 
recognize that a property right in personal data exists implicitly under 
state legislation, and then hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
personal data as an effect. 
It seems that the Court has been awaiting a moment to decide 
whether or not property rights exist in data for some time now.  Justice 
Scalia stated that whether or not computer data is an “effect” is “a really 
good question.”242  Justice Scalia refrained from answering a student 
from Brooklyn Law School who asked whether computer data is an 
effect, noting that “[t]hat’s something that may well come up.”243  Justice 
Gorsuch discussed the viability of an appeal to positive law in Carpenter 
for protecting CSLI under the Fourth Amendment but noted that 
Carpenter had waived that right by failing to assert it in courts below.244  
 
 238 Id. at 17. 
 239 Id. at 12. 
 240 See id. at 14. 
 241 Brady, supra note 79, at 1002.   
 242 Debra Cassens Weiss, Does the Fourth Amendment Protect Computer Data? Scalia 
Says It’s a Really Good Question, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 24, 2014, 1:06 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/asked_about_nsa_stuff_scalia_says_convers
ations_arent_protected_by_fourth_a. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 219. 
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The time may have arrived where, given the right case or controversy, 
the Court will hold that personal data is a form of property. 
A.  Defining Personal Data 
Personal data will need to be precisely defined to comport with due 
process requirements for fair notice and to avoid arbitrary enforcement 
of the law.  Advancements in technology demand adjustments in law to 
maintain the proper balance between liberty and security.245  Lower 
courts need guidance from the Supreme Court to handle challenges 
presented by modern technology, and law enforcement needs guidance 
to prevent overly permeating police surveillance.246  Carpenter dealt 
with historic CSLI, but this is not the only form of personal data that 
ought to be brought under the Fourth Amendment.  In crafting a 
definition for personal data under the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
should look to state data privacy laws for guidance,247 ensure that new 
forms of sensitive data that are likely to develop will be covered, and 
provide an intelligible definition that benefits both courts and citizens. 
Under this analysis, the most appropriate definition for personal 
data may be limited to those objects that exist independently of a 
person’s volition.  Biometric identifiers and biometric information 
should certainly fall under this definition, for not only do they exist 
independent of an individual’s will, but they are also largely 
unchangeable.  Other candidates to include are items that bear little 
relation to intimate thoughts or emotions.  For example, a person’s real 
name, street address, IP address, date of birth, and social security 
number are best understood as objects of property since the risk of 
abuse lies not in unwanted exposure or observation but in unwanted 
possession, use, or interference. 
Alternatively, a broadly defined concept of personal information 
could alleviate the struggle found in more Fourth Amendment cases that 
invoke Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test.  Katz’s 
conversation, for example, could be considered personal information 
under the CCPA once recorded because it is capable of identifying 
Katz.248  The third-party doctrine may also decrease in utility if the 
definition of personal data were to follow the path of the CCPA by 
 
 245 See generally Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24 (describing the interplay that new 
technologies create by providing new tools for both criminals and law enforcement 
agents). 
 246 See id. at 206. 
 247 Brady, supra note 79, at 1002 (“Fourth Amendment law is constructed by the 
‘concepts’ and ‘understandings’ that derive from social life and myriad state laws.”). 
 248 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020). 
MASCIANDARO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  3:59 PM 
1272 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1241 
excluding publicly available information from the definition of personal 
data.249  One difficulty with taking up the broadly expansive definition 
of personal data used under the CCPA is that it fails to provide clear 
notice as to what exactly personal data is.  The notion of “probabilistic 
identifiers” is particularly vague, employing a standard of being “more 
probable than not” that information identifies a consumer or device.250  
If the goal is a categorical rule providing clear notice to individuals and 
law enforcement, a narrower definition of personal data may be best. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS OF DECLARING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PERSONAL DATA 
Holding that personal data is an effect under the Fourth 
Amendment would have substantial implications.  While individuals 
would presumably enjoy constitutional protection over their data, the 
pervasive and varied nature of data can create confusion, rather than 
provide clarity, when applying a warrant requirement.  This Part 
explores challenges that may arise if personal data were recognized as 
an effect. 
A.  Implications of Treating Data as Property Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Recognizing personal data as property is likely to be met with its 
fair share of backlash.  The government may argue an impediment in 
prosecuting criminals, scholars may object on philosophical grounds, 
and businesses may fight vehemently on the grounds of an undue 
burden.251  Such a reaction should come as no surprise—it is known that 
changes in the law are dangerous.252  The likelihood of this backlash 
ought not to prevent the Court from recognizing that personal data is 
property for two reasons: (1) personal data is rightly understood as an 
effect, and (2) all of these criticisms can be quieted. 
First, consider those who argue that declaring a property right in 
personal data would impede law enforcement in prosecuting criminals.  
Law enforcement is not left without access to personal data under this 
approach.  Rather, law enforcement officers must simply comply with 
the Fourth Amendment requirement to ensure a search is reasonable.  
By demonstrating probable cause and acquiring a warrant, law 
enforcement can search and seize personal data. 
 
 249 Id. § 1798.140(o)(2). 
 250 Id. § 1798.140(p).  
 251 This objection is discussed in Section VI.B. 
 252 Pound, supra note 1, at 12. 
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Next, consider the philosophical objections that scholars are bound 
to launch.  As discussed in Part III above, the mistaken belief that data is 
intangible will likely be hurled critically at the Court.  But this 
conception lacks the scientific understanding that information is 
tangible once recorded.253  An online course in data science may silence 
the objections of critics arguing on the grounds of the intangible nature 
of data.  Though accepting the tangible nature of personal data would be 
useful in understanding that personal data is property, it is not 
necessary.  Property includes not only tangible possessions but 
intangible possessions as well.254 
A second philosophical objection may be raised because more than 
one person can possess data at the same time.  But, as noted above, 
complete ownership and exclusive control are not necessarily required 
for Fourth Amendment protection under a property-based approach.255  
Justice Gorsuch raised this point in his dissenting opinion in 
Carpenter.256  When an individual rents a home, rather than owning it in 
fee simple, the Fourth Amendment still protects that home from 
unreasonable search and seizure.257  Further, multiple individuals may 
share ownership in a home, and each is entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection. 
A third philosophical objection is likely to be that even if personal 
data is property, it should belong to the person or entity that creates the 
data, rather than the individual to whom the information pertains.  
While this argument has the support of the historic labor-based theories 
of property, personal data is unique to modern times.  It is unclear if 
property would have been so defined if expansive digitized records 
relating to individuals’ identities were available long ago.  Germany’s 
Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure has recognized 
this fact in proposing a law that makes data legally equivalent to other 
commodities.258  Among the principles that this law relies on are notions 
that “data should belong to the person to which the data pertains,” 
“public data is to be considered as open data,” and individuals should be 
able to make informed decisions regarding the use of their data.259  The 
 
 253 See Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 223 (“the scientific consensus [is] that digital 
information is not intangible, but is physical, tangible matter”); see also id. at 256 (“[T]he 
physical quality of information, and the idea that information is a physical constituent 
of the universe, are widely adopted within the scientific community.”).  
 254 Brandeis & Warren, supra note 159, at 193. 
 255 See United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018).  
 256 Id.  
 257 Id. at 2269–70. 
 258 Ritter & Mayer, supra note 87, at 229–30. 
 259 Id. 
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United States would be wise to adopt this principle, as it best protects 
the intimate relationship between an individual and his or her personal 
data. 
B.  Consequences of Treating Data as Property Against Private 
Actors 
As to the business organizations that are likely to kick and scream 
if property status works its way into the civil law against private actors, 
arguing that compliance is not feasible, the most straightforward 
response is that it is not that hard to delete data.  By deleting 
information, a business ensures it is not infringing on property rights 
that exclude unwanted possession, use, or interference.  While it is true 
that there may be a period that businesses need to expend significant 
funds in order to become compliant with new laws regulating data as 
property, this is no reason to abandon the protection that justice 
requires for personal data. 
If personal data were treated as property under a civil statute 
against private actors, individuals claiming an injury of their rights 
would be likely to proceed for injunctive relief.260  Generally, a violation 
of property rights is remediated by injunction, where a violation of a 
privacy right is remediated by money damages.261  This may pose a 
difficulty, as an injunction must be capable of precise definition in order 
to be effective.262  Consider the expansive definition of personal 
information present in the CCPA.263  How far would an injunction need 
to reach in the case of probabilistic identifiers?  Would all data that led 
to identification of the individual need to be included in the injunction?  
Would it suffice to eliminate just enough information to decrease the 
probability of identifying the individual?  If so, what information should 
be deleted?  Who gets to decide?  This trouble with applying injunctive 
relief presents itself in patent litigation.264  The difficulty in limiting the 
scope of the injunction to the asserted property interest leads to 
situations that “systematically overcompensate plaintiffs and overdeter 
defendants, with significant negative consequences for innovation and 
economic growth.”265 
 
 260 Id. at 249 (quoting Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179, at 786) (“[A] property rule 
provides for an injunction and a liability rule provides for nonconsensual access in 
return for a payment of money damages.”). 
 261 Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179, at 786. 
 262 Id. at 794. 
 263 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020). 
 264 Lemley & Weiser, supra note 179, at 784–85. 
 265 Id. at 785. 
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Perhaps there is a way around this, but perhaps this difficulty is 
unavoidable.  Though the Court likely ought to forge ahead and declare 
that personal data is property subject to Fourth Amendment protection, 
states may best be left to experiment behind the veil of their legal fiction.  
By persisting in regulating under privacy law while granting piecemeal 
property rights to individuals in their personal data, courts will not have 
to face the difficulties that arise in attempts to fashion appropriate 
injunctive relief. 
C.  Personal Data During a Pandemic 
In late 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic struck the globe and quickly 
became known as “an unprecedented situation” as a host of novel issues 
arose.266  The rapid spread of the coronavirus presented a challenge to 
concerns over personal data protections.  Technology could give 
governments the ability to stop the spread of COVID-19 by tapping into 
personal data revealing whom individuals come into contact with or 
monitoring adherence to stay-at-home orders.  But depending on the 
technology adopted, individuals’ rights could be compromised. 
Several governments around the world implemented contact 
tracing technology to contain the pandemic.267  Some technologies 
employ Bluetooth to detect individuals’ proximity to each other, 
providing information on when someone contacted a person carrying 
the coronavirus.268  These technologies fall on the less invasive end of 
the spectrum because they do not actually reveal an individual’s 
location.  Other technologies rely on GPS tracking269—creating the 
possibility of government access to the location data Supreme Court 
Justices have recognized could compromise individuals’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy.270  
 
 266 See, e.g., Bibiana Campos Seijo, An Unprecedented Situation, C&EN, Vol. 98, Issue 
11 (Mar. 21, 2020), https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/infectious-disease/
unprecedented-situation/98/i11; Tyler Thrasher, Amid Protests and COVID-19, GRTC 
‘Operating in an Unprecedented Situation,’ ABC 8 NEWS (updated June 3, 2020, 5:21 pm), 
https://www.wric.com/news/local-news/richmond/amid-protests-and-covid-19-
grtc-operating-in-an-unprecedented-situation. 
 267 Luke Dembosky, et al., Can Contact Tracing Apps Help Get Many of Us Back to Work 
Soon?  A Framework for Evaluating the Various Options and Legal Concerns, DEBEVOISE IN 
DEPTH: CORONAVIRUS RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/
insights/publications/2020/04/can-contact-tracing-apps-help (“China, Hong Kong, 
Israel, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have all had varying degrees of success in 
using electronic contact tracing . . . to allow a significant portion of their population to 
return to school and work, albeit with limitations.”). 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Freiwald & Smith, supra note 24, at 216–17 (long-term GPS monitoring). 
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Concerns amplify if the technology allows for real-time collection 
of data.  This would create the equivalent of wiretapping a conversation 
in the context of ongoing, immediate access to citizens’ locations.  For 
law enforcement to acquire information through a wiretap, officers 
must make a greater showing than needed for a typical 
warrant—demonstrating the sensitive nature of intercepting real-time 
information.271  Real-time access to individuals’ locations would be 
alarmingly invasive. 
If personal data were recognized as property, any government-
imposed location tracking would run head-on into Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Despite the grave nature of the pandemic, the United States 
government did not impose mandatory tracking via GPS technologies.  
Institutions, such as college universities, by and large, opted for less 
invasive contact tracing devices, such as those relying on self-reporting 
of symptoms and Bluetooth technology.  Those that did choose to 
mandate the use of a contact tracing app with GPS monitoring 
capabilities were met with backlash.272  Could this be evidence that 
personal data is already property in the minds of American citizens?  
Certainly, it lends support to that conclusion.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Personal data is gaining momentum on a path toward personal 
property status.  Legislatures are treating personal data as personal 
property.  Individuals are demanding and receiving control of their data 
as if it were their property.  The day may not be far off when the Court 
recognizes personal data as personal property—an “effect” falling 
squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s protections.  While useful, the 
legal fictions that create difficulties in administrating the law and risk 
leaving the vulnerable without protection would no longer be 
necessary.  The Court could recognize that personal data is implicitly 
treated as personal property under state legislation and hold that 
personal data is an effect under the Fourth Amendment.  Doing so would 
harmonize the original intent to protect effects under the Fourth 
 
 271 See Professor David W. Opderbeck, Cybersurveillance Developments, THE 
CYBERSECURITY LAWYER (June 10, 2016), https://thecybersecuritylawyer.com/2016/06/
10/cybersurveillance-developments (“For communications in transit, the Wiretap Act 
requires a showing of probable cause plus a showing that ‘normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.’  18 U.S.C.  § 2518(3).” (emphasis added)).  
 272 See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, Fearing Coronavirus, A Michigan College is Tracking Its 
Students with a Flawed App: And Students Have No Way to Opt Out, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 19, 
2020, 4:30 p.m.), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/19/coronavirus-albion-security-
flaws-app.  
MASCIANDARO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2021  4:00 PM 
2021] COMMENT 1277 
Amendment with the emergence of a novel form of personal 
property—personal data.  While remaining useful in other contexts, 
legal fictions would no longer be needed to protect personal data from 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
